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5. The Democracies Between the Wars (1919-1939)
Abstract
At first glance, the events of World War I seemed to be a triumphant vindication of the spirit of 1848. It was
the leading democratic great powers - Britain, France, and the United States - who had emerged the victors. In
the political reconstruction of Europe, republics had replaces many monarchies. West of Russia, new and
apparently democratic constitutions were established in Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Yet the sad truth was that by the outbreak of World War II
in 1939 the majority of the once democratic states of central and eastern Europe had been forcibly annexed by
stronger neighbors, or had severely curtailed their democracy, or had lost it outright. [excerpt]
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5. The Democracies between the Wars (1919-1939) 
At f i vigt glance. the events of World War 1 seemed to be a 
triumphant vindicatjon .oT~the "sj?jrit of 1848^ It was the~Tead^ 
in£L fifimrrat-j r pniirV^" -- "Britai"n, France, and the United' 
"^ ates — who had emeryed th^  y-j rtn-rs In the political recon­
struction of Europe, republics had T-pplarfari many monarchies. 
West of Russia, N^W apparently dpmoci^ic congrrrtrrrrrn^  WPTP 
fistahl 1 shed in Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithu­
ania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Yet the 
sad truth was that by the outbreak of World War II in 1939 the 
majority of the once democratic states of centraT and easteriT^ 
Europe had been forcitoly" 
severe!y curtai 1 e'H'Their democracyj,,,,or had lost it outrigTiTT^ 
After admitting that unique factors were operative in each 
case, one can recognize certain common weaknesses in central and 
eastern F.in;^ ean demnr-raf^ y which help to explain its VUlne~faTjll-
j,lj^:^.(CjFirst^ Cop lew of these states were economically viable, 
l^at i» Lo say, they seldom P0ssess¥a~"l:he ecnnnmir sti^ngth 
necessary to support thP> appar-atna nf «Ai f-p:overnment , 
especially wheQ.JjaxeaJ:ened bv avaririnnw nffighhr>r«a— For example, 
the new republic of Austria had plenty of delightful mountain 
scenery but not enough raw materials and industrial potential 
to support its capital, Vienna, once the truly imperial center 
of the Hapsburg Empire. The great depression of the 1930's 
intensified existing economic difficulties, and added new ones. 
e^co^ ) from the past these states inherited a legacy which 
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handicapped _deBa£xa£y. regimes had given the inhab-
Tiants little or no experience in self-governments They had 
nftc>n education and iprinKfcrlal i y.atinnNow the old 
ruling classes either opposed democracy outright or, bowing 
before the fad of the times, gave it only lip service. 
, not the least of these subversive legacies was 
natioi^ism. ]^tteX-msm.9xije.S-.ja£™.tiije.,a!^.CfiJ0LiL^efeat_a^ 
seffgent"Tr.ss nf national territory were very much alive in, 
for example, Germanjy and Bulgaria, Even among the victors, 
virtually no nationaTist found the poistwar settlement com­
pletely to his likingo Again and again, when they believed 
they had to choose between democracy and the attainment of some 
nationalist goal, the people chose the latter. Apparently what 
had really been the victor in 1918 was national independence, 
of which democracy was not necessarily the concomitant, 
( Fourth -iti an o-F r.lQcq 
tiontgythe stropp-^ol^ ideas, eit^ex: had never been 
strong Cjariiy hnfff^tari hv war revol 11 tioiji^ and 1 nf 1 atlon. 
It is no coincidence that the most successful democracy in 
eastern Europe was Czechoslovakia, which possessed a fairly 
balanced economy and a middle class of some size. 
C^iftl^_iri each of these states the regime faced problems 
of lovai -t-v unive feeling^Eat, oom 
what might, deiiiocrasy must bejmad^ Somecitizens 
longed f or a restoration of the Hapsburgs*;" the Hohenzollerns, 
or so m e  o t h e r  p r e w a r  r e g i m e .  t i o n a  1  mino r i t i e s  1  Q o k e d . . o n ^  
t(je frpnt.iex._tXL»^tJbueix,Jsl^^^ The relations of peas­
ants and landlords were often embittered, as in Rumania, by 
ethnic differences, Some idealists and -oppey^unis^s sougtit.,to 
ally themselves with one of the new totalitarian systems 
A" ^ .J ^ .00 la « •« <-<• MM <rVV Vk •« H Ct *« VM ^ 'V* "V* C! / Fascisirri^aSsmj or Communism — which claimed to represent 
'Hhe wave of'tie W the loyalties of one's fellow 
citizens are perennially open to question, democracy has tcugh 
going indeed. 
the atnallor g + Qtoa woon fomnH thoyngol vog morf^ or 
less^'^flTng pawns in the great powers' stLXiiggle,. In the last 
analysis, it was this which overthrew many of .them. Indeed, 
after admitting the weaknesses of democracy in central and east­
ern Europe, one might well marvel that it vorked as well as it 
did. 
In the United States, Scandinavia, Switzerland, the Low 
Countries, Britain, and France democracy did survive. In the 
1920's there were_ frequent attempts to get back to politics as 
usual, the politi'cs of pre-1914 with the same parties, the same 
"issues, and, in all too many cases, the same old faces. But the 
pressure^gfJjiomesti c .a.nd_.ijalej.natAonal. ey.eii±a.jaa^.j^^ de-
nie^ especially when the pall o£_ejcmiQmic depression .descended 
in the^TSSS^, 
The crisis of the depression years produced a serious 
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cliallenge t-"—^ yp^-ry eyi nf rienocratic institiit.i nna only 
cates of t he. Jaor X t ari aiiiam.,,a£. lie "ft and-Ri-gh t a e em e d 
under COntrol. In none of these states were the hard-won polit­
ical institutions of democracy seriously curtailed. The—3ra*el 
of the political party to which the voters in these countries 
gave support varied widely. In the the voters 
turned in 1932 to the Democratxa-.^)arty, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(1882-1945) and the New Deal. Xn.Fxaiice, the victors were gov­
ernments of the Centsx-^or, for a time, a Popular Front coali­
tion of leftistparties supporting the republic. In Britain, 
it was the Conservatives, masquerading as a multiparty National 
government, which~dli^cted the country's affairs from 1931. 
Wl^a-^is more striking than the differences in, label is the es­
sential similarities of program in thesji .djimQCxaGi • Social­
ists were~becoming more reformist, less revjnl utinnarv, ajyJ 
often_j,t_^was diffi^ from 1 liberal—pro­
ponent of the lyeIf state. Conservatives were fairly P1i-
a,^i'.r Most of tiaem, what^er their party label, now advocated 
the laissez-faire 1 iberalism^avoredJay- maiiy. radicals .a-xeulSry 
eaxiifix.; others lound it PosslbljeL.,lQ..,rec.QJiclle elements of the 
welfare state with conservatism— 
In general, following the precedent of that previous emer­
gency, World War I, the democracies had recourse to planning^ 
F^ were \^lling to await the working pf„jjiy.-s©-lf«a'eg«lalJjig 
featurB-3tr"tTie""eganoBiy7~A""wor^^ example of the new plan­
ning techniques was the American Tennessee Valley Authority, a 
government agency established to generate and sell electric 
power, control floods, facilitate the navigation of rivers, and 
combat poverty by mechanizing this backward region in the South. 
In line with certain contemporary economic 
pianning.„generally lavoLved increased ^Qvernmejxt--jBj>e.ndi.ng to 
prime the economic pump. In France, public expenditure rose by 
one-half in the decade after 1929. Businesses in difficulty, 
like American farming, were salvaged by government subsidies. 
Public works and other programs attempted to stimulate purchas­
ing power. Social security schemes, like that enacted in the 
United States in 1935, and labor legislation, like the forty-
hour week in France, were introduced. 
tO—carry economic planning,Into ,the international 
sphere were not jaearly so .successful. Rather, the tendency was 
for each state to attempt to steal prosperity from its neighbors 
by such neomercantilistic devices as currency devaluation and 
import quotas. Britain, the traditional free-trade state, 
finally adopted protective tariffs during the Great Depression. 
It could hardly be- fixpectexi-that-guch a^cxials-.- and so far-
reachlng--ar"l&gxslative program, would-.create, an era of politic 
good feeling. Tempers ran high because the stakes'^ere"^ 
Many lost confidence in the automatic superiority of all demo­
cratic institutions under all conditions. Legislatures and 
voters temporarily abdicated many of their powers by granting 
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the executive a limited right to govern by decree. Neverthe-
less. nojie of—the most prosperous and~the most 
accustomed to democracy, strayjsd far from what was for them the 
traditional form of government. 
• 
